Andrew Kopkind: *The Confessions of the CIA's Arch-Seducer, P. 3*

Twelve U.S. Religious Leaders Put Some Questions to Gen. Westmoreland

"Do you believe national decisions which might lead to a Third World War should not be discussed and debated? . . . Would it be patriotism on the part of those who dissent to say nothing? . . . We are told this is a limited war, yet limit after limit is being exceeded. How can we believe there is any limit beyond which U.S. escalation will not go?"

—Letter by Methodist Bishops Lord (DC), Stuart (Denver), Grant (Portland) and Alton (Madison); Episcopal Bishops Corrigan (NY), Davidson (Kansas), Moore (DC) and Butterfield (Vt) and Rabbis Lelyveld (Cleveland), Prinz (Newark), Gittelsohn (Boston) and Schwarzchild (St. Louis). Released May 3, but ignored by the press.

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. XV, NO. 17 MAY 15, 1967 WASHINGTON, D. C. 15 CENTS

A Dangerous Time to Dream of Dangerous Games

There never was a more deceptive headline in the *U.S. News & World Report* than the "How to Prevent A Nuclear War" on its cover May 15. This turned out to be another example of the propaganda being put out by the military-industrial complex in its campaign for an anti-ballistic missile system. This would be a $50 billion bonanza for the armament makers, a sharp spiral upward in the arms race but money down the drain as far as real security is concerned. The article reprinted Gen. Wheeler's statement in favor of building an anti-ballistic missile system to the House Appropriations Committee in the Defense Budget hearings just released May 3. Gen. Wheeler spoke as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their united opposition to the views of Secretary McNamara. The Joint Chiefs are trying to sell the view that there *is* a defense against the ICBM, and that if we had one we could successfully risk a nuclear first strike in defense of our "interests."

Pied Pipers of The Nuclear Age

The Joint Chiefs say they fear that the Soviets by deploying anti-missile defenses and hardening their ICBM bases (as we have already done) "would reduce U.S. confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses, thereby reducing the possibility that the U.S. would undertake a pre-emptive first strike against the Soviet Union, even under extreme provocation." The verbiage is as corkscrew as the mentality. What neither they nor *U.S. News* do not discuss candidly is that we are far from knowing definitely whether and on what scale the Soviets *are* building an ABM system. Nor does *U.S. News* give its readers from the House hearings the statement by Marshal Chuykov, the Soviet Chief of Civil Defense, admitting as recently as Feb. 22 that there is no way to "guarantee complete security . . . from the blows of the enemy's weapons of mass destruction." *U.S. News* does not deal with McNamara's contention that any ABM system can be countered, at less cost than the system itself, by increasing the number and size of the other side's warheads. And it does not give its readers this illuminating bit of testimony after the committee had heard both Wheeler and McNamara:

Mr. MINSHALL (R. Ohio): I think the result of the whole colloquy is neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would survive as a nation in an all-out nuclear attack.

Secretary McNAMARA: I think that is a fair conclusion.

Mr. MINSHALL: If we had a reasonably sophisticated ABM system in effect as would the Soviet Union, would that change the picture in any way to survive as a nation? You say you are going to save 120 million lives [McNamara nowhere makes so huge a claim—IFS]. Could we survive as a viable nation?

Secretary McNAMARA: Not if they maintained, as we think they would, their deterrent power.

The best answer the Joint Chiefs of Staff can give in the excerpt published by *U.S. News* is that "nobody can say at what point of nuclear destruction a nation is no longer a viable society." We'd hate to see a try-out. They say that the Soviets lost 25 million people in World War II yet survived. "These losses are not exactly comparable, of course," the Joint Chiefs admit, to what would happen in a nuclear war, "because they lost 25 million people perhaps over a period of some four to five years" while a nuclear war would involve "the loss of 25-or-more million people in a matter of hours, and the psychological shock and other effects would be considerably different." That is a model of understatement. With 25 million dead, there could easily be 25 or 50 million sick and wounded. Who would care for them? And in what hospitals? "Nevertheless," the Joint Chiefs insist, "one nation will probably survive best in a nuclear exchange. The 30, 40 or 50 million American lives that could be saved by Nike-X, therefore are meaningful." But how meaningful, if there were still 90, 80 or 70 million dead—for that is the

(Continued on Page Four)

Helpful Hint to the New Greek Regime

In the old days before there was a Red menace to provide a blanket excuse for U.S. interventionism, every leader of a liberation uprising against American domination was immediately dubbed a bandit. Aguinaldo in the Philippines was a bandit and Sandino in Nicaragua was a bandit. But we don't recall as genuinely a case of banditry as the interview in which a member of the new military junta ruling Greece (New York Times from Athens May 6) hinted that the fate of Andreas Papandreou might depend on whether the U.S. resumed the economic aid it discontinued in 1963 and increased the military aid which is running at $70 million a year. The military are preparing to try the younger Papandreou on charges of treason and assume that the U.S. has "a special interest" in him because his wife is an American.

If this doesn't work, why not try holding the American Ambassador for ransom?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What An Industrialized Country Like Ours Finds So Hard to Understand

McNamara Tries to Explain: Shutting Off Haiphong Not Worth The Risk

Rep. MINSHALL (R. Ohio): The Secretary and others who testified before us here said it does not do any good or won't do any good to close down the Port of Haiphong or shut down the rail lines because they only need this small limited tonnage in South Vietnam. . . .

Oil Port Facilities Already Destroyed

Sec. MCNAMARA: I said that closing the port of Haiphong [deleted] would not deter the North Vietnamese from bringing in whatever war associated supplies they required, such as POL [petroleum]. For all practical purposes we had already closed off the Port of Haiphong to POL in the sense of having destroyed their unloading facilities. But they continue to import essentially the same POL today as they did before our POL campaign was initiated on June 29. I think they would do the same thing for any other critical supplies. They could bring those over the beaches. When one thinks of the economy of North Vietnam, one must recognize that it is primarily agriculturally oriented. . . . I think they could all be cut off with the exception of a few supplies associated with military operations, such as petroleum, without forcing them to stop their operations in the South. . . .

Rep. MINSHALL: Fine, but you can put pressure on the people of North Vietnam and make them feel the pressure at home.

Sec. MCNAMARA: That is right. Another point, I agree that the interference with imports would put additional political pressure in effect on the political leaders of the North. However, it also brings with it great potential risks of widening the war. The question is balancing one against the other. Up to the present it has seemed unwise to incur those additional risks. (Discussion off the record.)

—Before House Appropriations, March 7, released May 4

Rep. SIKES (D. Fla): I have been puzzled by your insistence that we are doing all that we can possibly do in the way of bombing to stop the movement of supplies. . . . It would seem . . . that the greater pressure on North Vietnam would be productive of a change in their attitude toward a continued war.

Sec. MCNAMARA: I think you are quite correct in saying that the load will become greater. The problem from a military point of view is that their capacity is still substantial in relation to the load for the Southern guerrillas. Although the load will become greater, it will still be very, very small. . . .

Rep. MINSHALL: How about supplies to the civilian population of North Vietnam? Couldn't we put pressure on them?

Sec. MCNAMARA: There again the principal supplies are of local origin—rice which is grown locally and fish caught locally and charcoal and items of that kind which are produced locally. It is not a highly industrialized society depending upon imports or exports.

Rep. MINSHALL: Why then are they shipping so much into the port of Haiphong and by rail then from China? What is that total tonnage?

Sec. MCNAMARA: Actually their tonnage is quite small. . . . in the month of December we put through more dry cargo into South Vietnam through the ports than was put through the entire year in North Vietnam. We shipped into the south [deleted] times more wet cargo in 1 month than the North received in a full year.

Rep. MINSHALL: How much of this total tonnage is shipped south into South Vietnam?

Sec. MCNAMARA: . . . It is a very small quantity. Do you think that is a fair appraisal, General?

Gen. WHEELER: Yes. . . . If they can move in an average of a couple hundred tons a day of supply, they will be able to sustain the tempo of operations that they are doing today.

Rep. MINSHALL: What would happen, Mr. Secretary, in view of these imports of over [deleted] tons a year by all sources—if we successfully, or with 90% success, sealed off or stopped the flow of these imports into North Vietnam—what effect would that have on the war effort and the economy and the morale of the civilians in North Vietnam?

Sec. MCNAMARA: I think that the economy of North Vietnam could continue essentially without imports. . . .

Rep. SIKES: But it would be more difficult for them to supply the war in Vietnam.

Sec. MCNAMARA: Yes, that is correct. . . . The problem is that. . . . it is very small in terms of the North's capacity. It is extremely difficult no matter how skilled the air attack may be to stop such a small flow.

—Testimony Feb. 20 in same hearings, pps. 74-77.

29 Who Spoke Out

A letter urging President Johnson not to bomb or mine the port of Haiphong was made public May 5 by 29 House Democrats, worried by reports that action to close the harbor was under consideration. They were Bingham (NY), Brasco (NY), Brown (Cal), Burton (Cal), Cohelan (Cal), Conyers (Mich), Dow (NY), Edwards (Cal), Farbstein (NY), Fraser (Minn), Gilbert (NY), Green (Ore), Hawkins (Cal), Helstoski (NJ), Kastenmeier (Wis), Leggett (Cal), McCarthy (NY), Mink (Hawaii), Moorhead (Pa), O'Hara (Ill), Ottinger (NY), Rees (Cal), Reuss (Wis), Rosenthal NY), Roybal (Cal), Ryan (NY), Scheuer (NY), Tenzer (NY) and Yates (Ill).

New Glimpses of the Costs and Magnitude of Our Bombing in Southeast Asia

Relevant to this picture of the frustrations which occur in trying to bomb a non-industrialized society and a guerrilla force into submission are new disclosures in the same House hearings on plane losses. These show (p. 112) a loss of 2,083 planes in Southeast Asia from January 1961 through June 30 of this year (the last five months being an estimate). Of these 1,411 were fixed wing planes and 672 helicopters. In dollar terms these losses probably represent close to $2 billions. Related figures were disclosed by Senator Stennis May 5 at a Preparedness subcommittee hearing on pilot shortages. The Marines are short 851 pilots now and projected a shortage of 1,021 in the next fiscal year. The Chief of Naval Operations said the Navy was short 2,430 aviators. The Army (it flies the helicopters) has not yet been heard from and the Air Force figures have not yet been cleared.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An Impresario of Political Seduction "Tells All"—But Why the Confession?

He Claims to Have Fought With Ideas But He Bought Them for Cash

By Andrew Kopkind

Whether or not Tom Braden personally won the cold war, he was certainly its most energetic impresario. As the founder and director (from 1950 to 1954) of the CIA's Byzantine system of subsidies to anti-communist fronts, Braden started magazines, promoted conferences of intellectuals, and arranged concert tours, like a Sol Hurok out of Ian Fleming. "I remember the enormous joy I got when the Boston Symphony Orchestra won more acclaim for the U.S. in Paris than John Foster Dulles or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have bought with a hundred speeches," Braden says in the course of his misty-eyed defense of CIA covert-action programs in the current *Saturday Evening Post.* Such were the joys: the success of *Encounter* (an "agent" was editor), the impact of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the recruitment of Eleanor Roosevelt (for a women's committee front), the subversion of student councils, youth assemblies, and labor unions.

$50,000 in $50 Bills

Braden did not confine his interests to culture. He gave Irving Brown of the American Federation of Labor $15,000 to bribe dockers in France to unload American "supplies" (that is, arms). He says he shelled out $2 million annually to the AFL's Jay Lovestone, who used it to split the French and Italian labor movements. On one occasion, he gave Victor Reuther of the United Auto Workers $50,000 in $50 bills to buy off West German labor.

There was nothing "immoral" in all of that, Braden says, because morality does not apply in wartime, and "the cold war is a war, fought with ideas instead of bombs." Exactly what ideas were in his arsenal is unclear. Presumably, he meant to bombard naive foreigners with the notions that American institutions were independent, that the society was open, that there was fundamental democratic control of policy-making. "We started with nothing but the truth," Braden writes with typical modesty. But if there was any truth to those ideas at the beginning, covert-action soon dissipated it. Every major organization in the US with foreign policy interests was subsidized, manipulated or neutralized. The society was closed to organized opposition; resistance was impossible. No democratic body had the slightest knowledge of what the CIA was doing, nor could any exercise control. And the only truth the CIA could disseminate was the absolute value of cash. That medium was its message.

Braden's familiar rationalization is that covert-action was a purely defensive weapon. But one side's defense is the other side's aggression (the "Defense" Department, after all, runs the war in Vietnam). In the early Fifties, the CIA tried to buy Europe, if only on the cheap, as it has lately tried to buy the Third World. The CIA fronts may have been bulwarks against Stalinism, but they were also ways to render ineffective serious opposition to the economic and political system through which the U.S. exercises its modern, liberal version of the imperial mandate. Dissent—within the system—was not only allowed; it was encouraged. After all, as Allen Dulles (according to Braden) once told Senator Knowland: "in many European countries, a socialist is roughly equivalent to a Republican." The trick was not to destroy dissent but to de-fang it. After that, the dissenters—like the natives in Africa—became the most effective colonial agents.

Braden's *apologia* is really a significant contribution to an understanding of the colonizing process. Why he chose to tell all, or almost all, remains somewhat of a mystery. Until now, there have been only two indirect ways of establishing the connection of the CIA with front groups. One was by deduction from records of contributions made to organizations exposed in congressional investigations as CIA conduits. The other was the evidence given by Mike Wood, a National Student Association staff member who heard about the CIA operations second-hand, from his "witting" roommate, the NSA president. Braden supplies the first direct testimony.

It is hard to kick the habits of complicity. The CIA not only spread its value system abroad; it infected all it touched, or trickled down to, at home. Braden neatly exposed the hypocrisy of the Reuther brothers; they have been sounding off on the sins of others for a long time. George Meany's petulant press-conference denials were self-discrediting. He chopped logic with words: the AFL-CIO "never received any CIA money," but individual labor leaders "will have to speak for themselves."

The best that can be expected from the spy game is that it will discredit itself and its players. But before that happens, a pattern of thinking is established that is difficult to break. Washington is full of high and low officials with various "intelligence backgrounds." Like Braden himself, most are liberal, bright, active. He was a battling California Education Board chairman (*for* J. D. Salinger, *against* Max Rafferty), a fearless newspaper publisher, and the liberal candidate for lieutenant governor in last year's Democratic primary. But Braden and his *co*-operatives have absorbed all the predictable attitudes. They covet the status of inside-dopesterism. They know how hard it is to work through the open democratic process, and how easy to short-cut. They have once been agents of empire, and they are not likely to forget.

"I told [Allen Dulles] I thought the CIA ought to take on the Russians by penetrating a battery of international fronts. . . . 'You know,' he said . . . 'I think you may have something there. There's no doubt in my mind that we're losing the cold war. Why don't you take it up down below?' . . . It was decided that I should pitch my argument to [Frank] Wisner [CIA Director of Policy Coordination] . . . I thought, when I finished, that I had made a good case. Wisner gestured at the Chief, Western Europe. 'Frank,' came the response, 'this is just another one of those goddamned proposals for getting into everybody's hair.'"

—Thomas W. Braden, in the S.E.P., May 20.

Battle for Men's Minds—With Blackjacks?

"It was my idea to give the $15,000 to Irving Brown [the A. F. of L.'s overseas operative]. He needed it to pay off his strong-arm squads in Mediterranean ports, so that American supplies could be unloaded against the opposition of Communist dock workers."

—Thomas W. Braden, in the S.E.P., May 20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An Additional $50 Billions The Vietnamese War May Cost Us

(Continued from Page One)

obverse of these figures? And what of the net effect if building Nike-X, and then Super-Nike and then Super-Duper Nike, were only to encourage fresh increases in offensive power until we reach the point of saturation where no one survived?

As MacArthur Warned

What the Joint Chiefs will not face up to is that nuclear war is no longer a feasible instrument of national policy even, as they say, "under extreme provocation." As MacArthur warned in one of the final speeches of his life before the Filipino Congress in Manila, July 5, 1961, "If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. It [nuclear war] contains now only the germs of double suicide." This is what the Joint Chiefs are reluctant to admit, for to admit it is to admit the obsolescence of their own professions and the urgent need for a new world order, in which national armies will be abolished as a common menace to mankind. Twice in their presentation they speak of keeping alive the possibility, the threat or the option under certain circumstances of a first strike by the U.S. This is a dangerous state of mind. Thermonuclear weapons, unlike sabres, cannot be rattled safely. They talk of losing 25 million or more lives in the process as if this were some statistical trifle. They do not envisage a nation in ruins, without power, communications or government, a prey to panic and banditry. To have a Joint Chiefs willing to consider the unleashing of nuclear war is to risk this reality, not to prevent it.

A less complacent view of the potentialities came from that high government official who said here recently that we had to conduct the Vietnamese war "rather coldly" because our thermonuclear power is so "beyond comprehension" that we dare not let it get out of hand "if the Northern hemisphere is not to go up in smoke." We guessed in our issue of May 1 that this anonymous report in the *Baltimore Sun* (April 21) might have been President Johnson himself talking to Philip Potter. We have since learned it was Secretary Rusk in a backgrounder on Capitol Hill for constituents of Senator Percy. The remark is a measure of the dangers—dangers beyond our worst imaginings—in the steady escalation of the Vietnamese conflict.

On the one hand the growing intensity of the war makes it more difficult to reach any kind of agreement with the Russians. The hopes of Johnson and McNamara to negotiate a standstill with Moscow in offensive and defensive nuclear weapons may go up in smoke over Hanoi and Haiphong. A $50 billion dollar anti-ballistic missile race may be another of the costs of the Vietnamese war. On the other hand, as escalation rises, what if we bomb a Russian vessel in Haiphong or Russian ground-to-ground missiles sink a U.S. carrier in the Gulf of Tonkin? Would the Joint Chiefs of Staff see the former as occasion for a "pre-emptive" first strike before the Russians could react, or the latter that "extreme provocation" which would justify a nuclear surprise attack on the Russians? These are questions which should be raised before some irreparable incident occurs, even if the Joint Chiefs were sure it would end in one of those bargain basement nuclear victories —with only 25 million dead!

Another Vietnam High in The Andes?

Those members of Congress who say we should never have gotten involved in Vietnam, but now that we're there, etc. . . . should be challenged on our first steps toward involvement in Bolivia. We have in mind especially Senators Stennis and Russell. They have the power to halt intervention before it takes on such dimensions as to put American prestige at stake. A regime that is thrown into crisis by 30 to 120 guerrillas in one inaccessible corner of the country isn't worth much. The impact of the guerrillas is on the prestige of the military. "The open snickering" at their "ineptness" is described by John M. Goshko (Washington Post, May 9). He writes from La Paz, that for the average Bolivian the army "has managed to lose every war in the nation's history and has functioned mainly as a private militia that enables a tiny white oligarchy to keep the Indian majority in virtual servitude." We are sending in arms and U.S. Rangers. The more we send the greater our identification with the oligarchy and the military.

We'll Send Free Sample Copies of This Issue to Your Friends If You Send Us Stamped, Addressed Envelopes—

I. F. Stone's Weekly 5618 Nebraska Ave., N. W. Washington, D. C. 20015

Please renew (or enter) a sub for the enclosed $5:

Name .....

Street .....

City ..... **Zip**..... **State**.....

5/15/67

For the enclosed $5 send a gift sub to:

(To) Name .....

Street .....

City ..... **Zip**..... **State**. .....

Indicate if announcement wished ☐

I. F. Stone's Weekly

5618 Nebraska Ave., N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20015

Second class postage paid at Washington, D. C.

NEWSPAPER

I. F. Stone's Weekly. Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C. Published every Monday except in August, the last week in December and the first week in January and Bi-Weekly during July at 5618 Nebraska Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. An independent weekly published and edited by I. F. Stone; Circulation Manager, Esther M. Stone. Subscription: $5 in the U.S.; $6 in Canada; $10 elsewhere. Air Mail rates: $17 to Europe; $20 to Israel, Asia and Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED